By Dr Mathilde Buelow

A week ago, the Brexit supporting press became excited with German Chancellor Angela Merkel when it was reported that she was softening her stance on the principle of freedom of movement within Europe. It was, they argued, the first sign that Europe’s political and economic leader might agree to the deal of which the Brexit camp dreams; securing for Britain free trade with the European Union and at the same time regaining for Britain control over immigration.

A few days later, however, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble stomped on these dreams by reaffirming that the four principles underpinning the single market, including that of the free movement of people, remained sacrosanct. There was no way Germany would agree to let Britain opt out of one while retaining the others. Schäuble even hinted that Germany would look to benefit from Brexit by luring many of the lucrative financial jobs now in London (and also Edinburgh and Glasgow) to Frankfurt once Britain left the single market.

This was not a case of the classic good-cop, bad-cop routine on the part of Germany. Far from saying that Germany might compromise on the principle of free movement, Chancellor Merkel had only referred to the possibility of limiting the benefits that migrants receive once they move within Europe. It reaffirmed in no unclear terms the position Germany has held since the vote for Brexit.

The most important thing to understand is that the strong position the German government has taken against a Brexit Britain getting its dream deal is that it is not really aimed against Britain. The overriding issue in German minds, from Chancellor Merkel on down, is the same as it’s been since the Second World War, securing Germany’s position in Europe, and Europe’s position in the world. Germany is and will continue to be, more concerned with its relationships with Paris, Rome and Brussels than with London, and is shaping its response to Brexit accordingly.

For Germany, the European project has always been about more than free trade. It has allowed Europe to prosper out of the ashes of the Second World War and has provided political security and stability as well as economic opportunity. Then, as now, it was not so much Germany’s relationship to Britain that lay at the heart of this ambitious project (for the EU ultimately represents a certain worldview), but its relationship to France and the other founding members, Italy and the Benelux countries. These nations (not to mention Germany itself), are currently facing unprecedented political challenges from the same forces that first unleashed Brexit, so much so that some observers have already referred to Chancellor Merkel as the last defender of the liberal-democratic order. A softening of Germany’s stance on Brexit would only embolden these forces, undermining the very foundation upon which the European project rests.

This belief has been further reinforced by the election of Donald Trump, which has unleashed even more uncertainty. The German response has been to call for greater unity and cooperation, not less, especially in the crucial realms of foreign policy, security and defence.

We can end with some speculation about how all this might play if there was another Scottish independence referendum. Officially, of course, there has not yet been any change to German policy. The UK remains a full EU member-state and as such Berlin cannot formally negotiate with the Scottish government. If faced with the prospect of another Scottish independence referendum, the German government will view it through the same prism that it now views Brexit—first and foremost, how will this affect the EU? From that angle, we can guess that the German state would be more sympathetic to a pro-EU independent Scotland after Brexit, than it was to the breaking up of a UK within the EU in 2014.

Those who speak of both their desire for independence and for Brexit, as some in the SNP and others have recently done, would achieve the opposite. They could lead to Germany, indeed the rest of the EU, washing their hands of a parochial Scotland. If, on the other hand, Scottish independence were framed in such a way that the vote was seen as a reaffirmation of Scotland’s place within the EU, it would only be natural that Germany would look upon this benignly. In that way, Germany’s position on Scottish independence will probably first be determined by the results of the Brexit negotiations, and then by the positions taken by those arguing for independence in any subsequent referendum.

Dr Mathilde Buelow is a history lecturer at Glasgow University, an expert in German foreign policy and co-director Scottish Centre for War Studies